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Political Economy of U.S. Sanctions toward Myanmar 
Abstract 
Do international sanctions make difference? This has been one of the central 
questions long debated in foreign policy circles and international relations academia. In this 
regard, the U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar is an important case involving the policy goal of 
regime change and democratization. This study focuses on three central questions: What is 
the economic impact of U.S. sanctions on Myanmar’s export? How did the military regime 
respond politically to the sanctions? What is the overall degree of effectiveness of U.S. 
sanctions in achieving the policy goal? As from the first attempt, it is found that the main 
hypothesis of U.S. sanctions being ineffective in impairing Myanmar’s export cannot be 
rejected due to significant results of increased export to non-US countries during the sanction 
period despite the zero export to the U.S. according to the gravity model analysis. However, 
the growth rate of Myanmar’s export can be concluded as a slower rate when it is compared 
with the neighboring countries especially when newly industrializing countries such as 
Thailand and Malaysia are included in the analysis. The second attempt of analysis on the 
export structure proved that Myanmar become more dependent on natural resource exports 
especially natural gas and gemstones mainly to Thailand and China. From this analysis, it can 
be summarized that the military regime’s responses to the U.S. policy actions manifested the 
high degree of political impact of sanctions. 
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I. Introduction 
 Do international sanctions make difference? This has been one of the central 
questions long debated in foreign policy circles and international relations academia. In this 
regard, the U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar is an important case involving the policy goal of 
regime change and democratization. After 22 years of different episodes, the policy goals of 
the U.S. seem to be achieved despite the glitches observed in the constitution and the change 
process itself; the policy shift and the waiver process took 7 years after the first signal for 
engagement by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. This study was inspired by the unique 
political economy pattern of the U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar which stimulates to go deep 
with possible analyses that can explore certain impacts it has made to the nation. The aim of 
this study is to provide a comprehensive view of the case of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar
through analyses with different lenses. This study focuses on three central questions: What is 
the economic impact of U.S. sanctions on Myanmar’s export? How did the military regime 
respond politically to the sanctions? What is the overall degree of effectiveness of U.S. 
sanctions in achieving the policy goal? 
The first attempt is to test the hypothesis that U.S. sanctions were not effective in 
impairing Myanmar’s export as the trade went up with other countries during the sanction 
period. This was brought about by the gravity model analysis on Myanmar’s export for the 
changes before and during sanctions. It also looked for the comparison with neighboring 
countries, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh to check the validity of 
argument with the regional trend. The second attempt to explain the economic impact of 
sanctions on Myanmar’s export is an inquiry on the drivers of export before and during 
sanctions. In this sense, the study went into details such as changes in the export structure and 
trading partners. The third attempt is to understand more about the other side of the story 
through the analysis on the political impact of sanctions on Myanmar. The idea is to check 
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the U.S. policies after major historical events and the response pattern of the military regime 
to different levels of sanctions. Finally, this study attempted to assess the overall political 
economy impact using the analytical framework developed by Hufbauer et. al. in their great 
study of “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2007)”. The original case analysis for their 
study was reviewed and revised based on changes in the situation till present time to draw 
consistent conclusion on the success of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar. 
 In the next section, the background information of the study was provided briefly 
followed by the general theory of economic sanctions in Section III including the nature of 
this foreign policy tool and the evaluation of success. In Section IV, it summarizes the brief 
overview of U.S. sanctions including the political background of Myanmar. In Section V, it 
provides the list of previous studies of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar and other papers that 
used the gravity model to analyze Myanmar’s trade. In Section VI, the study provides the 
gravity model analysis and the further look into the export structure. In Section VII, the study 
uses the timeline as a political analysis of U.S. policy actions and reactions of the military 
regime continued with reviews and revisions of the analytical framework of Hufbauer et. al. 
In Section VIII, there is a brief conclusion that also includes the gaps of this study. 
II. Background 
On October 7, 2016, one of the great news for the nation of Myanmar was directly 
aired from the White House. It was President Obama who revoked all the previous executive 
orders and waived the remaining sanctions toward Myanmar under the JADE (Junta's Anti-
Democratic Efforts) Act 2008 by announcing the termination of the national emergency (The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). This was the greatest turning point in the 
bilateral relations since last three decades which visualizes the brighter future of the relation 
of two nations; Washington’s Policy before this day can be described in one word as 
“sanction”. This was also the final step of deleting that very word, “sanction,” which was 
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executed as the bit-by-bit waiver process since 2012. The State Counsellor Aung San Suu 
Kyi, herself, witnessed this historic announcement during her visit to the U.S.
 Before this day, 28 years ago, the nation of Myanmar faced the national tragedy of 
losing so much blood of sons and daughters in the coercive crackdown of the 8888 uprising. 
During the next one or two decades, the nation could hardly find a warm and friendly 
diplomacy from the U.S. and the West as they put continuous pressures to restore democracy 
and to demand Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader who was detained under house arrest 
for many times, and other political prisoners back on the stage. In this regard, “sanction” was 
the language they mainly spoke to State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later 
renamed as State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta ruled till the 
end of 2010. 
 It is known that the nation was alienated in the international community and notorious 
for military generals’ power in politics and economy; they were denoted frequently as villains 
in the international media. However, the nation had gone through these dark days until the 
new constitution was materialized by the power transfer to the civilian government in 2011. 
Even though there was a big doubt on President Thein Sein administration which was 
composed by the former military generals, the reforms were visible enough to make it 
possible to shift the Washington’s Policy; President Obama witnessed the change. 
III. Theory of Economic Sanctions 
Throughout the history, economic sanctions have been a political tool in the case of 
offense toward a certain nation. The first enforcement of statecraft which can be denoted as 
an economic sanction, so far, is observed in Greek city states dated in 432 BC. Even though 
historians argued about different causes of the Peloponnesian War between Athens-led 
Delian League and Sparta-led Peloponnesian League, the Megarian Decree was the important 
turning point in power dynamics as it aimed for the economic pressure toward Corinthians 
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who were members of the later party. Under the decree proposed by Pericles and approved by 
the Athenian Assembly, the small, landlocked polis called Megara, the supporter of Corinth, 
was embargoed prohibiting the access to Athenian markets and ports (Bonner, 1921). 
From the Peloponnesian War till the World War 2, sanction regimes were enforced as 
a prewar or war-complementary statecraft. It was only since the Post-war era when the 
sanctions were categorized as a foreign policy motive and an alternative to war (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). In modern days, objectives of economic sanctions vary from 
modest policy goals such as anti-terrorism, anti-narcotic, democratic regime change and 
human rights promotion to settle expropriation claims, and cybersecurity. The economic 
pressure is strategically imposed to disrupt military adventures, enhance nonproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons, or impair the military capability by
limiting the dual-use technologies or war resources (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). 
Sanctions are defined as “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations 
for foreign and security policy purposes” (Masters, 2015). Major powers consider sanctions 
as an alternative of the lower cost and risk to the military action when the national interest for 
taking action is less than vital or the diplomatic action is not feasible. However, this very tool 
is used to coerce, deter, punish, or shame “target” entities that threatens the national interests 
of the “sender” or the international order. Sometimes sanctions are also imposed to buy more 
time before the international system can activate full fledge intervention (Masters, 2015). 
 When the sender imposes a sanction on the target, the interest of the sender is not 
merely showing disapproval toward the actions of the target. Economic sanctions normally 
have a triple signal toward target, allies and domestic constituencies; the enforcement is
differently meaningful for different parties (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). To
allies, the sender implies that it is still a trustworthy partner who can ensure deeds after words 
and violation of the interests of the league is not tolerated. To domestic constituencies, 
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imposing sanction means the government is doing something to safeguard the nation’s vital 
interests; pleasing voters is the essence of liberal democracy. In such case, the use of 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool should be debated if it is instrumental or mere 
demonstrative. 
 In the theory of economic sanctions, there has been a long debate on defining the 
success. The two big questions, in this case, would be on the standard for and degree of
contribution by sanctions. The set of success of factors are different based on the standard for 
sanctions, instrumental or demonstrative, which must be viewed with different deductive 
lenses (Pape, 1997). Even if the foreign policy goals are met, another question on the 
composition of exogenous and endogenous factors should be considered for the degree of 
contribution by sanctions. 
Even though sanctions are used extensively till nowadays, these episodes are not 
complete solutions and, in many cases, the success is less obvious. Hufbauer et al. proposed 
several possible limitations based on the study of previous experiences of the United States as
a sender. It is to be highlighted that the problem lies in the sender itself when the ends it
aimed and the means it conducted are, often, unmatched. It is clear that the higher the aims 
the stronger the action should be. No matter how sanctions are well-crafted, there are always 
antidotes that allow targets to avoid impairment impacts; citizens of the target may rally for 
unification in support of target regime; commercial alternatives in the form of trade diversion 
toward other countries may substitute the previous trade creation with the sender (Hufbauer, 
Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007).
The role of other actors such as sender’s allies and target’s allies also determines the 
success of sanction episodes. Hufbauer et al. denoted target’s powerful allies who support the 
target during sanction to offset the hostility as “black knights”; sender’s allies may also 
perceive as alienated if they have a desire to continue the trade with the target, a conflict of 
13
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interest with the sender (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). In some cases, the interests 
of domestic businesses of the sender may even be compromised for political and foreign 
policy purposes which may lead to domestic resistance toward sanctions to the target. 
IV. U.S. Sanctions Toward Myanmar 
A. Political Background of Myanmar During Sanction Period 
In modern days of Myanmar, the year of 1988 left a big scar in the country’s history. 
The biggest pro-democracy uprising initiated by the student movement spread out the whole 
nation which was contained coercively by the military regime killing thousands of civilians; 
the new military regime was formed as “State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).” 
In 1990, SLORC held the multiparty election in which the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who was detained and put under house arrest in 1989, won 
82 percent of the seats. But SLORC threw out the election results and held the military-
dominated National Convention in 1993; hundreds of pro-democracy activists including 
elected members of the parliament were arrested. In 1997, Myanmar became the member 
state of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the military regime was 
renamed as the “State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).” For Aung San Suu Kyi, 
since 1995 release, she was put under house arrest for two more times, in 2000 (released in 
2002), and in 2003 (released in 2010). In 2007, the saffron revolution, a political protest led 
by Buddhist monks, broke out and again contained coercively by SPDC. 
The story of democratic reforms began in 2004 with another National Convention to 
draft the new constitution with the provision for 25 percent military seats in parliament which 
was approved in 2008 through national referendum. Since 2011, after the first election in 20 
years, the nation started the new face of democratic government even though the military-
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won the majority of the seats in the 
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parliament and Thein Sein became the first president under the new constitution. Along with 
democratization and political transformation, Myanmar has taken initial steps for its reforms 
on 1) political, 2) economic and social, 3) public administration and 4) private sector by 
laying the foundations and frameworks. 
In 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi and many other members of NLD party were elected as 
members of parliament in by-election. The second election was taken place in 2015 in which 
Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD party won the landslide victory. Recently, she assumed the 
office as the State Counsellor, the Minister of President Office and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs while Htin Kyaw became the new president since Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be 
president due to the provision limiting presidency of the person whose spouses or children 
being foreigners.  
B. Brief Overview of U.S. Sanctions toward Myanmar 
Even though the diplomatic relation went back and forth after the independence of 
Myanmar, the US policy toward the nation was normalized – granted as one of the countries 
which enjoyed the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) and the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) since 1976 and the U.S. supported with development aids and the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) until 1988 (Martin, 2012). The US policy started to 
change since 1988, when the biggest pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar was contained 
coercively by the military spilling the blood all over the nation and the new military regime 
was formed. After the resolutions from the Senate and the House of Representatives, Regan 
administration suspended all the U.S. aid to Myanmar including counternarcotics programs 
and arms sales followed by the amendment of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
program which stopped the preferential trade and the designation of drug-producing and 
trafficking country which stopped loans of international financial institutions by Bush 
administration in 1989 (Martin, 2012). 
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In response to the ignorance of 1990 election results, the Congress passed the
Customs and Trade Act of 1990 which granted presidential authority to impose sanctions by 
which Bush administration refused the bilateral textile agreement in 1991 (Martin, 2012). As 
the first time obvious response by SLORC on the threat of possible sanction, Aung San Suu 
Kyi was released in 1995 after the introduction of the bill of Free Burma Act of 1995. In 
1996, Clinton administration issued the presidential proclamation for suspending visas and 
the Congress approved a new sanction in 1997 for all non-humanitarian assistance, visa ban 
of government officials and voting against assistance in international financial institutions 
(Martin, 2012). 
 The peak of U.S. sanctions episode reached in early 2003 with the Congress approval 
of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 2003, a full fledge sanction, and the Executive 
Order of Bush Administration under the Act after the forceful crack down of Aung San Suu 
Kyi and NLD leaders (Martin, 2012). After the saffron revolution 2007, the Congress passed 
the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act and two 
Executive Orders were also issued by the Bush Administration. 
Following the democratization process in Myanmar, President Obama appointed a 
new ambassador in 22 years, announced the waiving of “bans on the exportation of financial 
services and new investment,” and “the ban on imports” except those blocked by the JADE 
Act and Executive orders, and the Congress passed the law to grant the presidential authority 
to waive IFI assistance in 2012 (Martin, 2013). In 2013, President Obama issued another 
executive order to withdraw the general prohibition of imports other than jadeite, rubies or 
jewelries containing them and waive the financial sanctions (Burma Sanctions Program, 
2015). Finally, on October 7, 2016, President Obama announced the termination of the 
national emergency and revoked all sanctions toward Myanmar after the meeting with the 
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). 
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V. Existing Studies 
Given the political situation and the U.S. sanctions episodes described earlier, the 
political economy of Myanmar has changed dramatically during two decades. Especially, the 
U.S. sanctions had a huge impact on the country’s trade flows both in products exported and 
trading partners. In 2000, textile and apparel export was 42% of total exports of the country 
which became less than 10% in 2011 while the growth in minerals, oil and gas sector export 
was substantial from 6% to 39% within 10 years (Anukoonwattaka & Mikic, 2012). During 
the sanctioned period, Myanmar’s export was pushed up over last decade not only to 
Thailand and China but also to India with the primary sector products for major proportion of 
above 60% in 10 years including natural gas, beans and wood logs (National Export Strategy 
of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2015-2019). That makes the country’s export 
vulnerable to the shocks in Thai market and Sino-Myanmar relations. Moreover, other 
empirical results also showed that Myanmar is more prone to the “Dutch Disease” than other 
Southeast Asian countries because the counterfactual predicted values of non-resource 
exports during 2004-2011 are less than the actual exports if the effects of natural resources 
are taken into account (Kubo, 2014).
In order to further assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar, Nyun 
conducted a political and economic assessment based on the framework of Hufbauer (Nyun, 
2008). From the political perspective, he argued that the U.S. could not influence Myanmar’s 
Asian trade partners, even though their Western allies joined, which offset the sanctions by 
increased trade with Thailand, China, India and other ASEAN neighbors; U.S. also 
deteriorated the relationship with Myanmar. From the economic perspective, he analyzed that 
the U.S. sanctions divested the U.S. political ideas about freedom, democracy and human 
rights through economic struggle. In addition, prior trade linkages were very limited to 
impose the immediate cost to the U.S. but U.S. domestic business interests were deteriorated 
17
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as a long-term cost undermining the chance of success. Moreover, the foreign policy 
objectives were unclear putting human rights and democracy at the front, indirectly 
demanding for regime change, without major improvements in past 2 decades. It was also 
culturally insensitive to aim for rising up and demanding change in a Buddhist agrarian 
society which worsened the inequalities between military and civilians. Since Nyun’s study 
using political and economic framework of Hufbauer was conducted in 2008 during the 
military junta, there is also a room to capture recent changes in political economy of 
Myanmar both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Furthermore, Myanmar has a strong untapped trade potential due to the weak trade 
with advanced economies. After the sanction episodes of European Union and U.S., the 
nation can be reintegrated with the world economy to fill the potential gap faced in last 
decade (Ferrarini, 2013). Ferrarini also argued that macroeconomic stability, infrastructure 
and human capital development, financial reform including the foreign exchange regime at 
home and taking advantage of regional opportunities through adjustments of industrial 
structure, and full positioning as a natural logistic hub can enhance the export growth and 
trade diversification. 
Even though there are previous studies and literature which assess the impacts of the 
U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar, there is still a room for the empirical analysis of export 
patterns before and during sanction period in order to test the ineffectiveness of sanctions to 
impair the Myanmar economy as a target in the presence of regional “black knights.” In this 
regard, the gravity model of international trade can be used to analyze attribution of sanctions 
on Myanmar’s export over different periods and toward different trade partners. However, 
Ferrarini’s study and Kubo’s study, mentioned above, have already applied the gravity model 
to generate the counterfactual analysis on Myanmar’s trade potential. In this study, the 
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gravity model will be applied to analyze the direct impact of sanctions on the export to non-
US countries rather than counterfactual predictions.  
VI. Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions toward Myanmar 
A. Overview of the Myanmar’s Export Trend
 Before the deeper regression analysis using the gravity model, the growth pattern of 
Myanmar’s export can be reviewed as a prima facie case. Figure (1) describes how 
Myanmar’s export to all trading partners for all commodities changes from 1995 to 2013. The 
overall trend can be interpreted as an exponential growth since 2000 resulting a ten-fold 
increase to $11,152,167 in 2013 from 1999-volume of $1,121,195 despite the sanctions 
imposed by the U.S. starting from 2003. 
Figure (1) – Myanmar’s Export Volume to All Trading Partners (1995-2013)
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (2016). Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
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Figure (2) – Export Volumes of Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh and 
Malaysia to Top 20 Trading Partners (1995-2013) 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (2016). Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
 In Figure (2), when the growth rate is compared with other countries with the similar 
level of initial export volume in 1995 such as Bangladesh and Vietnam, it is found that 
Myanmar was growing at a much lower rate like Cambodia. Despite the differences of initial 
export volume in 1995, Thailand and Malaysia can be displayed as the countries of export 
success and Myanmar’s export growth can be analyzed as being slow rather than significantly 
exponential in comparison with the neighbors during the period of U.S. sanction. 
B. The Gravity Model Analysis 
 The gravity model has long been used for the empirical analysis of international trade 
flows. Since after the introduction by Tinbergen (1962), thousands of studies proved the 
impacts of different political, economic and geographical variables on the trade flows 
including economic sanctions. The name “gravity” comes from the Newton’s law of gravity 
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which bears the similitude as the exports being directly proportional to the economic mass of 
two countries and inversely proportional to the distance (Shepherd, 2012). In this study, the 
usual heavy-duty trade analysis tool, the gravity model, is used as the first attempt to answer 
the question of the impact of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar. It is to analyze the economic 
impact of U.S. sanction by interpreting its impact on Myanmar’s export to all trade partners 
other than U.S. in comparison with the trends before the sanction period and also in 
comparison with the trends of neighboring countries – Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh and Malaysia. From the countries sharing the border with Myanmar, China and 
India are not suitable candidates to include in the study because of their large economies. 
Laos is also not one because it is a landlocked country without port facility. Therefore, three 
more continental Asian countries which are, as well, ASEAN members – Cambodia, Vietnam 
and Malaysia were added to the study. 
C. Data and Methodology 
 In this study, two different sets of panel data are used for bilateral export values and 
GDP for the time period of 1995-2013 from the UNCTAD Data Center. The choice of source 
and time period was made due to the limitations in data availability in other sources for 
Myanmar as well as Taiwan, which is the major trade partner for the exporters in the study. 
However, the time period is long enough to analyze the impact of U.S. sanctions (2003-2012) 
since it includes eight years before the sanction. The first dataset covers Myanmar’s export to 
all trading partners including 147 countries during the period of study alongside with their 
GDPs. In the second dataset, bilateral export values of six countries on analysis, Myanmar 
and five neighbors, to their top 20 trade partners during the period of study are included, 
again, alongside with their GDPs. 
 For other gravity covariates in both datasets such as bilateral distance, contiguity and 
colonial historical linkages, the bilateral dataset from CEPII (The Centre d'Études 
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Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales) developed by Mayer and Zignago (2005) is
used. In this study, weighted distance measures from the dataset are used which are 
calculated based on the bilateral distances of two largest cities weighted with the population 
share of the city in each country. Other bilateral dummy covariates include contiguousness 
(contig), common official language (comlang_off), colonial link (colony), common colonizer 
after 1945 (comcol) and being the same country before (smctry). 
 Finally, the dummy variables of interest are created as sanc, nonus and their 
interaction term sancxnonus. For the time period of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar, sanc 
takes 1 and otherwise, including all time periods for other five countries, takes 0. If the 
importer is U.S., nonus takes 0 and for the trading partners of all six exporters other than U.S., 
nonus takes 1. 
 As mentioned above, the main econometric model of this study is the gravity model 
which can be specified in its intuitive form as below: 
??? ? ????
????
?????
?? (1) 
where Xij is the export from origin country i to destination country j, Y is the gross domestic 
product of each country, Dij represents the trade cost between each pair of countries. In order 
to estimate the coefficients of variables, the equation can be transformed into natural 
logarithms as below: 
?????? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ???????? ? ??? (2) 
 Since the introduction of the model by Tinbergen (1962), the trade cost is specified 
with the bilateral distance between two countries as the main proxy variable with other 
additional dummy variables such as neighborhood and Commonwealth preference which is 
later expanded to different factors affecting the bilateral trade cost. In this study, the trade 
cost will be specified with the bilateral weighted distance (distw), contiguousness (contig),
common official language (comlang_off), colonial link (colony), common colonizer after 
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1945 (comcol) and being the same country before (smctry) which adds up to the equation (2) 
as: 
?????? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ???????????? ? ???????? ?
????????????? ?????????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ??? (3) 
 However, the intuitive model does not include the impact of trade costs of the origin 
with other countries rather than the destination or trade costs of the destination with other 
countries rather than the origin leading to the omitted variable bias (Shepherd, 2012). In order 
to deal with this issue, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) introduced the theoretical model 
based on the demand function as below: 
?????? ? ????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ????? ? ?????? ? ??? (4) 
where E is the total expenditure of country j (assumed to be equal as GDP), Y is the world 
GDP, σ is the elasticity of substitution, Πi is the outward multilateral resistance of the origin 
and Pj is the inward multilateral resistance of the destination. The two multilateral resistance 
terms capture the impact of trade cost to and from other countries on the origin and the 
destination. By grouping the terms of origin and destination, the model can be rewritten as: 
?????? ? ?? ? ???? ? ???? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ??? (5) 
where Fi is the exporter fixed effect which captures both GDP and multilateral resistance of 
the origin, Fj is the importer fixed effect of both expenditure and multilateral resistance of the 
destination and the regression constant equals to the world GDP which is the same for all 
exporters and importers. In this study, Dij will include the terms specified earlier. 
 As in many other studies and the gravity model literature, there are a few more things 
to take in account for the econometric model in this study. The first issue is the zero trade 
values which became missing values when transformed to logarithms. Particularly in 
Myanmar case, there are zero trade values with the U.S. during the sanction period which is 
the subset of the observations mainly focused but omitted in regression analysis. This issue 
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was handled by log(x+1) transformation which turns zero trade values into 1 and logarithmic 
transformation as 0 with a small tradeoff of bias. The second issue is that the export values 
are Xijt, not Xij, and the need to capture the time variant heterogeneity. In this study, the issue 
is dealt with the inclusion of year fixed effects in estimation. Since the error terms of the 
gravity model are heteroskedastic, robust standard errors must also be applied to fix the 
violation of homoscedasticity in OLS (Shepherd, 2012). Finally, another option used in 
estimation is clustering the data into bilateral distances. In gravity equation, errors are 
normally correlated with country pairs and therefore, clustering the distance which is unique 
identifier for country pairs will eliminate the problem of understated errors (Shepherd, 2012). 
D. Results and Analysis 
 In table (1), the regression results of the gravity model applied for the impact of U.S. 
sanction on Myanmar’s Export to all other trading partners are reported using the first dataset. 
It includes bilateral export volumes of Myanmar to 147 trading partners over 19 years which 
counted for 2753 observations; there were no observations in early years for newly 
established nations. All estimations in this case use the intuitive model from equation (3) 
while column (1) – (4) compared the estimation results using ordinary least squares 
regressions and column (5) – (8) applies panel data methods to check the robustness. The 
second columns of each method, column (2), (4), (6) and (8), show the estimated coefficients 
in which year fixed effects are included to control for the variations in outcome over time that 
is not attributed by the explanatory variables. As described earlier, the main variables of 
interest are sanc and the interaction term, sancxnonus. The partial effect to be reported, the 
impact of sanctions on the export volume to non-US countries while other variables are held 
fixed, can be captured from the coefficients of those variables of interest. In particular, the 
impact of sanction can be calculated as [(eβ-1) * 100%] in which β is the sum of the 
coefficients of sanc and sancxnonus, since the equation is in the form of log-level. 
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Table (1) – The Gravity Model Analysis for the Impact of Sanction on Myanmar's Export 
with All Trading Partners 
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Country 
Pair FE
(4)
Country 
Pair FE
(5)
Panel RE
(6)
Panel RE
(7)
Panel FE
(8)
Panel FE
lnexpgdp -0.853*** -0.560*** -0.765*** -0.311 -0.834*** -0.511** -0.765*** -0.311
(0.115) (0.154) (0.212) (0.271) (0.126) (0.160) (0.207) (0.264)
lnimpgdp 1.183*** 1.180*** 0.989** 0.751* 1.137*** 1.087*** 0.989** 0.751*
(0.101) (0.101) (0.341) (0.368) (0.113) (0.114) (0.332) (0.358)
lndistw -1.725*** -1.726*** -5.482*** -5.882*** -1.744*** -1.767*** 0 0
(0.361) (0.363) (0.697) (0.745) (0.362) (0.366) (.) (.)
contig 0.161 0.161 -3.271*** -3.385*** 0.179 0.189 0 0
(1.685) (1.693) (0.455) (0.477) (1.733) (1.793) (.) (.)
colony 3.146*** 3.156*** 6.212** 7.650*** 3.336*** 3.530*** 0 0
(0.503) (0.505) (2.083) (2.246) (0.543) (0.542) (.) (.)
comcol 0.315 0.311 -0.199 -0.0965 0.253 0.184 0 0
(0.423) (0.424) (0.158) (0.170) (0.435) (0.432) (.) (.)
smctry 2.465* 2.471* 1.600*** 1.807*** 2.564* 2.667* 0 0
(1.183) (1.188) (0.169) (0.190) (1.240) (1.277) (.) (.)
sanc -8.448*** -8.963*** -8.455*** -9.101*** -8.448*** -8.995*** -8.455*** -9.101***
(0.0941) (0.156) (0.102) (0.180) (0.0951) (0.153) (0.0989) (0.175)
nonus -1.157 -1.172 -6.176* -8.242* -1.446* -1.745* 0 0
(0.690) (0.693) (3.010) (3.253) (0.737) (0.741) (.) (.)
sancxnonus 8.991*** 8.992*** 9.049*** 9.115*** 9.007*** 9.020*** 9.049*** 9.115***
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.153) (0.134) (0.137) (0.137) (0.149)
Constant 11.38* 4.314 50.92*** 50.96*** 12.52** 6.345 -2.315 -7.512
(4.501) (5.190) (12.98) (13.53) (4.353) (5.186) (4.709) (5.100)
Time fixed 
effects
- Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Country-pair 
fixed effects
- - Yes Yes - - - -
Observations 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753 2753
R2 0.526 0.537 0.781 0.793 0.075 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 The R2 values in Column (1) and (2) shows that the intuitive model explains more 
than 50% of variations in the outcome variable as a good start. The signs of significant 
gravity terms including the logarithm of importer GDP and distance, colonial relationship and 
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being the same country before appears normal except the logarithm of exporter GDP term; it 
shows the larger the growth of Myanmar’s GDP, the smaller the growth of export which goes 
against the theory of gravity. Without the year fixed effects, it is reported that Myanmar’s 
export to non-US countries is increased by 72% during the sanction period and with the year 
fixed effects, the increase is 3%. These estimations are highly significant since the robust 
standard errors are very small and p-values are less than 0.001. 
In column (3) and (4), R2 values show the improvement in explaining the variations of 
outcome variable to 78% and 79% when country pair fixed effects are also controlled. In 
Column (3), The signs of the significant gravity terms are almost the same as column (1) and 
(2) having the same problem with exporter GDP except the additional problem with the 
contiguity variable in which the coefficient is negative; it means there was less export to 
countries sharing the common border than the rest of the world. But the exporter GDP term 
becomes insignificant in column (4) when both country pairs and year fixed effects are 
controlled. For the impact of sanction, column (3) estimates for 81% increase during the 
sanction period and column (4) estimates for 1.4% increase again with very small robust 
standard errors and p-values less than 0.001. 
 Column (5) – (8) applies the panel data methods to check the robustness. The panel 
random effects method reports for 75% increase in export during the sanction period and 2.5% 
increase when year fixed effects are also included. The panel fixed effects method in column 
(7) and (8) omits the time invariant gravity terms and reports for exactly the same effects as 
column (3) and (4). 
In short, all estimation methods report for the increase of Myanmar’s export to non-
US countries during the sanction period which is very much in line with the prima facie case 
but the degree of increase estimated depends on additional controls applied to the model. 
When the U.S. imposed sanctions toward Myanmar, the instrumental goal of economic 
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pressure can be identified as impairing the economy in such way as a decline of export 
volumes attributed by zero export to the U.S. Furthermore, considering the international 
cooperation to the U.S. by imposing a degree of restraints on Myanmar as a part of the policy 
goal of the sanction, the export to non-US countries can be expected to decline as well. From 
the results of table (1), it clearly shows that the decline of Myanmar’s export to non-US 
countries during the sanction period was not the case. 
Table (2) reports the regression results of the gravity model applied for the impact of 
U.S. sanction on Myanmar’s Export in comparison with neighboring countries – Thailand, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Bangladesh and Malaysia – using the second panel dataset. Since the 
bilateral export volumes of 6 countries to their top 20 trade partners over 19 years are 
included, this dataset consists of 2280 observations.
Table (2) – The Gravity Model Analysis for the Impact of Sanction on Myanmar's Export in 
comparison with Neighboring Countries (1995-2013) 
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Country 
FE
(4)
Country 
FE
(5)
Panel RE
(6)
Panel RE
(7)
Panel FE
(8)
Panel FE
Ln(GDPi) 1.279*** 1.309*** 1.029*** 1.108*** 0.552 0.0886
(0.0713) (0.0888) (0.136) (0.136) (0.350) (0.610)
Ln(GDPj) 0.590*** 0.614*** 0.672*** 0.669*** 1.205*** 0.787**
(0.136) (0.145) (0.106) (0.126) (0.327) (0.263)
Ln(distw) -0.913*** -0.931*** -0.600 -0.600 -1.019*** -1.005*** 0 0
(0.224) (0.228) (0.457) (0.459) (0.211) (0.215) (.) (.)
contig 0.459 0.452 0.745* 0.745* 0.403 0.414 0 0
(0.324) (0.328) (0.319) (0.321) (0.347) (0.334) (.) (.)
comlang_off 1.094*** 1.036*** 0.226 0.226 1.369*** 1.258*** 0 0
(0.247) (0.264) (0.287) (0.288) (0.251) (0.260) (.) (.)
colony 0.697*** 0.693*** 0.407 0.407 0.579* 0.605** 0 0
(0.177) (0.179) (0.405) (0.407) (0.227) (0.196) (.) (.)
comcol 0.355 0.383 0.153 0.153 0.365 0.388 0 0
(0.357) (0.363) (0.305) (0.306) (0.361) (0.359) (.) (.)
smctry -0.655 -0.618 0.477 0.477 -0.934 -0.839 0 0
(0.638) (0.662) (0.495) (0.497) (0.633) (0.645) (.) (.)
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sanc -12.04*** -12.12*** -10.06*** -11.27*** -10.19*** -10.43*** -9.644*** -9.859***
(0.340) (0.366) (0.372) (0.392) (0.109) (0.108) (0.193) (0.225)
nonus -1.564*** -1.512** -2.552*** -2.552*** -1.305* -1.304* 0 0
(0.433) (0.453) (0.562) (0.564) (0.508) (0.523) (.) (.)
sancxnonus 11.28*** 11.27*** 11.25*** 11.25*** 9.969*** 9.956*** 9.656*** 9.734***
(0.430) (0.437) (0.394) (0.395) (0.269) (0.270) (0.304) (0.294)
Constant 0.183 -1.035 19.87*** 18.30*** 2.371 0.740 -9.244*** 0.108
(1.814) (1.977) (4.358) (4.359) (2.178) (2.346) (1.453) (5.565)
Time fixed 
effects
- Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Exporter fixed 
effects
- - Yes Yes - - - -
Importer fixed 
effects
- - Yes Yes - - - -
Observations 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280 2280
R2 0.626 0.643 0.648 0.728 0.305 0.348
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Column (1) and (2) shows the coefficients of the intuitive model from equation (3) 
using the ordinary least squares regressions. The R2 values of these column shows that the 
regressions can explain more than 60% of variations in the export volume. The significant 
estimations of the regular gravity terms show the correct signs as expected i.e., positive signs 
for logarithm of GDP terms, common language and colonial relationship and negative sign 
for logarithm of distance. When the year fixed effects are not included, it indicates that 
Myanmar’s export to non-US countries is 53% less than neighboring countries during the 
sanction period while the larger effect of 57% is observed with the year fixed effects. 
 Column (3) and (4) shows the coefficients according to the theoretical model of 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) from equation (5) which includes the country fixed 
effects for exporters and importers excluding the GDP terms. The R2 values for these 
columns are also quite high, 65% and 73% respectively explains the variations in the 
outcome. According to the country fixed effects estimations, Myanmar’s export to non-US 
countries is estimated as 229% more than neighboring countries during the sanction period 
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when year fixed effects are not included. With the year fixed effects, Myanmar’s Export to 
non-US countries during the sanction period is estimated as 2% less than neighboring 
countries. The results of this model is quite different from intuitive model showing very little 
effect of sanction or even positive effect is captured as two-fold increase. 
 Column (5) – (8) shows the coefficients from panel data estimation methods using 
random effects and fixed effects to check the robustness. The impact of sanction on 
Myanmar’s export to non-US countries is estimated as -20% without year fixed effects and    
-38% with year fixed effects using panel data random effects method. The results of the panel 
data fixed effects method, again, shows that all other time invariant gravity terms except 
GDPs are omitted and estimated impacts are 1% increase without year dummies and 12% 
decrease with year dummies. 
 Therefore, when the year fixed effects are applied, apart from the theoretical model, 
which shows very little negative impact, other estimation methods agree that Myanmar’s 
export to non-US countries was less than the regional trend attributed by the rapid growth of 
Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam during the sanction period. As in the prima facie case,
considering Cambodia and Bangladesh also for slower growth rate of export, there may be 
some other factors apart from sanction to be imputed for the slower growth of Myanmar or 
the more rapid growth of mentioned countries which cannot be explained by the scope of this 
study. 
E. Myanmar’s Export Structure
As the first attempt to explain the impact of U.S. sanctions through the trend of export 
volumes discredited the economic facet of the case, this study conducts a deeper look into the 
export structure and trading partners as a second attempt to further understand the economic 
impact of U.S. sanctions. 
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Figure (3) – Export Structure by Product Groups (1995-2014) 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (2016). Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
Figure (3) shows the export structure of Myanmar during 1995-2014 by product 
groups such as all food items, agricultural raw materials, ores and metals, fuels, manufactured 
goods and others.  It shows that the fuels export started to grow in 2001 and since then it has 
been the major driver for the growth in total export volume. In 2001, the volume of fuels 
export was only 582 million which increased more than seven-fold over a decade resulting 
4336 million in 2014. This is due to the commercialization of natural gas started in 2001 
(Fujita, Mieno, & Okamoto, 2009). For manufactured goods, the big time seems to be during 
2007-2009 with the volume around 1500 million and later increase again in 2014 for 1826
million. Moreover, pearls, precious stones and non-monetary gold came to the stage since 
2010 for 1871 million, sustained at a level of more than 1 billion in 2011 and 2012, and rose 
again to 1907 million in 2013. 
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Table (3) – Export Structure by Product Groups (1995-2014) Percentages 
Year
All food 
items
Agricultural 
raw materials Fuels
Manufactured 
goods
Pearls, 
precious 
stones and 
non-
monetary 
gold Others
1995 42% 39% 0% 12% 5% 2%
1996 43% 31% 0% 17% 6% 2%
1997 43% 26% 0% 24% 4% 2%
1998 37% 25% 0% 31% 4% 3%
1999 23% 30% 0% 37% 4% 6%
2000 20% 22% 6% 47% 1% 4%
2001 23% 15% 24% 35% 1% 2%
2002 24% 16% 25% 32% 1% 2%
2003 21% 19% 26% 30% 1% 2%
2004 18% 22% 32% 25% 2% 3%
2005 20% 19% 33% 23% 1% 3%
2006 19% 19% 34% 23% 1% 4%
2007 19% 20% 33% 23% 1% 4%
2008 20% 18% 35% 22% 1% 4%
2009 21% 18% 34% 23% 1% 3%
2010 17% 9% 34% 5% 22% 13%
2011 19% 15% 38% 10% 15% 3%
2012 20% 14% 39% 9% 16% 2%
2013 20% 13% 39% 9% 17% 2%
2014 20% 13% 39% 17% 9% 2%
However, the changes in the composition of export structure around the sanction 
period shows three important trends according to table (3). The first trend is the decline of 
food items and agricultural raw materials and the rise of manufactured goods in late 1990s. 
The second trend is the decline of manufactured goods and the rise of fuels in early 2000s. 
And the third trend is the increased composition of pearls, precious stones and non-monetary 
gold during 2010 to 2013. This shows that Myanmar was starting to be industrialized in late 
1990s with manufacturing before the sanctions and became dependent on natural resources 
since the commercialization of natural gas began in 2001 and the enactment of Burmese 
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. Moreover, it is observed that the export of gemstones 
rises from nowhere two years after the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-
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Democratic Efforts) Act 2008 which focuses on any jadeite, rubies or any articles of jewelry 
containing them mined or extracted from Myanmar. 
Figure (4) – Export Structure by Top 10 Trading Partners (1995-2014) 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat (2016). Retrieved from 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
Table (4) – Export Structure by Top 10 Trading Partners (1995-2014) Percentages 
Year CHN HKG DEU IND JPN MYS SGP THA GBR USA
1995 11% 5% 2% 12% 7% 3% 16% 17% 1% 7%
1996 11% 5% 2% 14% 8% 3% 16% 10% 2% 9%
1997 6% 4% 3% 19% 9% 5% 15% 7% 3% 11%
1998 6% 4% 5% 16% 8% 5% 11% 6% 3% 16%
1999 8% 3% 5% 13% 8% 4% 8% 9% 3% 19%
2000 6% 2% 4% 9% 6% 4% 6% 13% 5% 26%
2001 5% 1% 4% 13% 4% 3% 4% 28% 4% 17%
2002 5% 1% 3% 13% 4% 3% 4% 29% 4% 14%
2003 6% 1% 4% 14% 5% 3% 3% 32% 4% 11%
2004 7% 1% 4% 14% 6% 4% 2% 39% 5% 0%
2005 7% 1% 4% 15% 6% 4% 3% 38% 5% 0%
2006 7% 1% 4% 14% 6% 4% 3% 38% 5% 0%
2007 7% 1% 4% 14% 6% 4% 3% 38% 5% 0%
2008 7% 1% 4% 14% 6% 4% 3% 38% 5% 0%
2009 7% 1% 4% 14% 6% 4% 3% 38% 5% 0%
2010 5% 19% 0% 11% 2% 2% 3% 37% 0% 0%
2011 7% 14% 0% 14% 4% 3% 4% 42% 2% 0%
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2012 7% 15% 0% 14% 4% 3% 4% 42% 2% 0%
2013 7% 15% 0% 14% 4% 3% 4% 42% 2% 0%
2014 7% 15% 0% 14% 4% 3% 4% 42% 2% 0%
 Figure (4) and Table (4) describes the export structure of Myanmar to its top 10 
trading partners during 1995-2014. It shows three important trends around the U.S. sanction 
period and parallel with changes in the product composition described above. The first trend 
is that the U.S. became the top trading partner in 1999 with 216 million which accounted for 
19% and doubled in the next year to 423 million and 26% share. Even though the level was 
sustained over 400 million till 2002, the share declined to 14% in 2002. This trend was in line 
with the rise of manufactured goods in late 1990s and the fall in early 2000s. Here comes the 
second trend where Thailand became the top trading partner since 2001 with the volume of 
665 million and the share of 28% which grew to 4675 million in 2014 with the peak share of 
42% since 2011. This trend was again in line with the rise of fuels in early 2000s. These two 
trends shows that the beginning of industrialization with manufactured goods during the 
period of the U.S. being the top trade partner was overwhelmed by the rise of fuels during the 
period when Thailand became top trade partner; again, as a result of the enactment of
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and the commercialization of natural gas 
began in 2001. The third trend is the rise of export to Hong Kong as a part of China which 
together became the second largest trading partner with more than 20% share of total export 
since 2010. The total export volume to China and Hong Kong amounted for 2088 million and 
later rose to 2502 million in 2013. This trend is in line with the rise of gemstones since 2010, 
two years after Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act 2008. 
 The answer from the second attempt to evaluate the economic impact of U.S. 
sanctions toward Myanmar is that the nation became more dependent on natural resources 
such as natural gas and gemstones in which the growth of total export during the sanction 
period is heavily relied on Thailand and China as main trading partners. 
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VII. The Political Economy of U.S. Sanction and Regime Change 
After the analysis of direct economic impact of U.S. sanctions on Myanmar’s export 
structure, it is required for further attempts to explain why the nation went for the regime 
change and democratization. In this regard, a comprehensive political timeline was 
constructed as the third attempt to describe the response pattern of the military regime to U.S. 
sanctions in light of the major historical events from 1988 to 2008. The time period for this 
analysis is trimmed for the starting point of sanctions till the sanction peak of U.S. before the 
policy shift in 2009. The general pattern of United States and Myanmar relations throughout 
the history had a declining trend since the end of World War II but imposition of sanctions 
began only after the uprising in 1988 for the reason of violation in human rights and civil 
liberties of oppositions and the people (Martin, 2012). In September 2009, the U.S. Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton said, "the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn't influenced 
the Burmese junta," and the U.S. would go for both engagement and continued sanctions 
(Kessler, 2009). Therefore, it is assumed that patterns of the U.S. policy and the response of 
the military regime between this period will reflect the political impact of U.S. sanctions 
toward Myanmar.
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A. Analysis of U.S. Policy Actions and Reactions of the Military Regime 
Table (3) describes the detailed timeline of the historical events in Myanmar, the U.S. 
policy actions and the military regime’s responses during 1988-2008. The main theme of this 
analysis is to understand the relationship between the intensity of the U.S. policy and the 
extent of timely responses of the military regime to evaluate the level of political impact of 
sanctions. The facts and data are centered around the military regime, Aung San Suu Kyi and 
NLD Party, the U.S. Administration and the Congress, and other major nations of concern, 
i.e., supporters of the U.S. and Myanmar. For the convenience of analysis, the sanction 
episodes should be divided as before 1995, 1995-2003 and after 2003 according to different 
level of intensities and response patterns. 
For the first episode before 1995, the intensity of sanctions was quite low and can be 
classified as the gradual withdrawal of positive relationship. The underlying intention of this 
episode can also be analyzed as demonstrative showing disagreement towards coercive crack 
down of 1988 uprising, negligence of election results and detention of opposition leader. The 
actions taken by the military regime were rather consolidation of power than responding to 
the U.S. policy. Therefore, in this episode, both the U.S. and the military regime were “doing 
their own jobs” with their own interests and the action-reaction pattern is insignificant. 
The intensity of sanctions became moderate in the second episode 1995-2003 
approaching to the final warnings before extensive sanctions. The U.S. policy actions became 
more diverse ranging from introduction of extensive sanction laws in the Congress to 
Administration’s action of the next level. The underlying intention seemed to shift from 
demonstrative one to taking negative reinforcement toward the consolidation of power by 
military regime and putting pressure to maintain Aung San Suu Kyi on the stage. The 
reaction of military regime also started become obvious in favor of the U.S. policy in the 
immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi after introduction of Free Burma Act 1995. This first 
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reaction seemed to motivate the U.S. policies as a continuous pressure responded by the 
restructure of the ruling junta in 1997. The final warnings came as the introduction of import 
ban in the Congress after the second detention of Aung San Suu Kyi which was responded 
again by the release. This episode provides evidence, to an extent, of mild action-reaction 
pattern which can be inferred as military regime’s interest to normalize the relationship with 
the U.S. 
The final episode before the peak in 2008 shows the exponential increase to high 
intensity which changed the game. After the third detention of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 followed by the 
Executive Order as the comprehensive strike of political and economic statecraft. The 
response of the military regime was also historical as it was the foundational move to the new 
chapter of regime change toward all reforms. The regime announced the “Road Map to 
Disciplined Democracy” in the next month to reconvene National Convention, draft the 
constitution, hold the national referendum for the constitution and hold elections. This action-
reaction pattern decorated the highest political impact in the whole series of sanctions 
providing the significant evidence. However, the peak of all episodes was the Tom Lantos 
Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act 2008 which boosted the strength 
of sanction in the name of brutal crackdown of “Saffron Revolution” protests in 2007. There 
was no further immediate action observed since the draft constitution was finalized and the 
national referendum had approved the constitution before passing the Act. The rest of the 
story followed the roadmap as described earlier. 
From this analysis, it can be summarized that the military regime’s responses to the 
U.S. policy actions manifested the high degree of political impact of sanctions. However, the 
obvious deviations from the policy goals are also observed as glitches in the process such as 
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi only after the election, maintaining military power in the 
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constitution, the former generals reclaimed the victory in the election as USDP and 
problematic sections in the constitution even though the military regime went for the 
democratic reforms. These factors could lead to the delays in materializing the shift of the 
U.S. policy toward Myanmar in which the waiver process initiated only after the victories of 
Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Party in 2012 by-election. Another possible factor for military 
regime’s reactions for normalization with the U.S. could be its perception on Beijing’s 
influence which grew enormously over Myanmar due to the absence of the relationship with 
the U.S.; this study cannot explain as it is out of the scope. 
B. Analytical Framework for Costs of Defiance and Compliance 
In their great study of “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Hufbauer et al. utilized 
the rich history of 20th century sanction regimes counted for 174 cases, including U.S. 
Sanctions toward Myanmar, to examine the enabling situations of delivering results and 
making contributions toward foreign policy goals. In this study, findings from the study of 
Hufbauer et al. on Myanmar case will be reviewed and revised as a fourth attempt to 
understand the political economy of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar using the same 
analytical framework. 
The analytical framework was based on four broad factors – actors, time, tools and 
standard (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg, 2007). Actors are roughly sender and target 
mainly at the unit level of nation states which can be enlisted more details based on the case 
of sanction, if it is unilateral or multilateral. Unilateral sanctions can be called as single-
sender case while multilateral sanctions include leading sender and supporters; it can also be 
systemic action in which international institutions such as United Nations involve. Moreover, 
sanctions can also have positive externalities such as deterrence to the bystanders from 
committing the similar behavior or advocacy to the domestic audience. In such cases, 
stakeholders of externalities can also be considered as actors. 
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The time of analysis for sanctions also matters setting the starting point when it is 
officially announced in terms of law enactment or issuance of presidential orders and the 
ending point when the results are secured as they are aimed for. It seems that Hufbauer et al. 
attempted to crop out the prelude and postlude of sanctions to filter the final foreign policy 
goal from evolving intentions in revision, i.e., the real process and result of each case from 
later deviations and the chain of results. 
In terms of “tools”, they differentiated between trade and financial sanctions. Trade 
sanctions involve export and import restriction which have not only direct impact of 
reduction in trade volume with the sender but also indirect effects such as lower prices for 
embargoed export products domestically or to other countries and higher prices for substitute 
imports from other countries. Financial sanctions involve unit level measures such as freezing 
assets of target nation state in the control of the sender and restricting the flow of 
international loan and aid to the target. There are also individual level measures such as 
freezing individual properties in hand of the sender, restricting sender’s domestic firms from 
doing business with those black-listed individuals or visa bans to them. When considering the
tools, Hufbauer et al. clearly differentiate and exclude the positive economic incentives –
such as aids, credits and preferential trade – which are, in many cases, closely tied with 
economic sanctions as a carrot-and-stick approach.  
For the factor of “standard”, implications of sanctions are measured in terms of direct 
results or the extent of contribution toward foreign policy goals. The main idea is to increase 
the cost of defiance and to decrease the cost of compliance. In order to increase the cost of 
defiance, the sender can seek out for international cooperation to form multilateral sanctions 
for more intensive economic pressure or endorsement by legitimate international institutions 
for more powerful political foundation. Even though it is not compulsory, accompaniment of 
military action may enhance the achievement of the foreign policy goal of sanctions as well 
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as stimulation of domestic political dissatisfaction of target’s citizens may bring about the 
regime change efficiently. This strategy is aimed at cornering the regime of the target to alter 
strategic decisions in favor of sender’s interest. For the cost of compliance, it depends largely 
on how small the actual magnitude of the cost is, what the level of perceived cost is for the
target and how the target weighs various cost items. In order to achieve conformance, it is 
important to create the impression that the cost of compliance is quite low. 
However, there are also other factors that can interfere the intended standard by 
decreasing cost of defiance as well as that can lead to the leverage of sender toward the target. 
As mentioned before, “black knights” can support the target to offset the negative impacts of 
sanctions by the sender. Domestic support to the target regime for the sake of nationalism and 
the evasion capability of target to trade sanctions also matter by reducing the cost of defiance. 
The sender may also enjoy the leverage toward the success of sanctions due to the prior 
volume of trade and finance flow and comparative size of economy over the target. Finally, 
what also determines the standard of sanctions is the intensity of sender’s interest if the 
sender actually would like to see the compliance or impose just for “do[ing]-something.”
Drawing insights from the factors – actors, time, tools and standard, Hufbauer et al. 
came up with the variables that determine the cost of defiance and the cost of compliance 
which was applied to Myanmar case as described in column (1) of table (4). Column (2) 
shows the findings of this study based on the updated situation till present situation. 
Table (6) – Political Economy Assessment of U.S. Sanctions toward Myanmar 
(1) HSEO Summary 
till 2006*
(2) Revised Analysis till 
present situation
Overall Assessment
Policy result, scaled from 1 (failed) to 4 (success) 2 4
Sanctions contribution, scaled from 1 (negative) to 4 
(significant)
2 3
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Success score (policy result times sanctions contribution) 
scaled from 1 (outright failure) to 16 (significant result)
4 12
Political and Economic Variables
Companion policies: J (covert), Q (quasi-military), R 
(regular military)
– –
International cooperation with sender, scaled from 1 
(none) to 4 (significant)
2 3
International assistance to target: A (if present) – A
Cooperating international organizations – –
Sanction period (years) 18+ 20+
Economic health and political stability of target, scaled 
from 1 (distressed) to 3 (strong)
2 2
Pre-sanction relations between sender and target, scaled 
from 1 (antagonistic) to 3 (cordial)
2 2
Regime type of target, scaled from 1 (authoritarian) to 3 
(democratic)
1 1
Type of sanction: X (export), I (import), F (financial) F, M F, M
Cost to sender, scaled from 1 (net gain) to 4 (major loss) 2 2
*Source: Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Case Histories and 
Data [CD-ROM]. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
 As shown in table (6), the major revisions required for the case analysis of Hufbauer 
et. al. is the overall assessment indices and the assessment on international cooperation to 
sender and international assistance to target. In the case of European Union, even though it 
adopted a Common Position to impose sanctions in 1996 for travel ban, arms embargo and 
cessation of aid, the extended restrictive measures to the trade of timber and minerals began 
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only in 2007 (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013). Similarly, the Special Economic Measures (Burma) 
Regulations of Canada also came into force in December, 2007 which includes arms embargo, 
asset freeze and technical assistance prohibition (Global Affairs Canada, 2015). Given the
imposition of these sanctions beyond the period of study of Hufbauer et. al., it can be 
considered that the cooperation of EU and Canada in the sanctions toward Myanmar is 
underrated as minor cooperation. Since the extensive nature of these sanctions can be 
considered as meaningful restraints, the international cooperation should be rated for 3 points 
as the modest cooperation. 
 Moreover, in the case analysis of Hufbauer et. al., international assistance to target 
was marked as absent. But just after the timeframe of the analysis, in January 2007, China 
and Russian Federation voted against UN Security Council Draft Resolution on Myanmar 
with their vetoes as described in the timeline analysis. Moreover, even though Japan 
announced some temporary suspensions, they have been the major provider of official 
development assistance over two decades. Considering these factors, the international 
assistance to Myanmar can be evaluated as present rather than absent. 
 Finally, Hufbauer et. al. assessed the policy result as “unclear but possibly positive 
outcome” rating 2 points and sanctions contribution as “little or no contribution” rating 2 
points. It was true by the end of 2006 but the later reform processes developed till current 
situation will disagree this assessment.  As described earlier, the nation has already taken the 
path of regime change and democratization including the transfer of office after the landslide 
victory of NLD party. Recently, the U.S. has also lifted all sanctions declaring the end of the 
national emergency. In this regard, the policy result can be rated as successful for 4 points. 
Similarly, in light of the political timeline of action-reaction analysis by the military regime 
described in earlier section and rapprochement efforts of President Thein Sein’s 
Administration, it should be considered as contributed substantially rating 3 points. This will 
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give the success score of 12 points out of 16 as a multiplication of the two elements. In short, 
the U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar can be analyzed as a highly successful case according to 
the analytical framework of Hufbauer et. al. in which different political economy factors 
proved the significant impact of U.S. sanction toward Myanmar. 
VIII. Conclusion 
 Different studies on sanctions reported different levels of success through different 
forms of analysis on the impact. In this study, the unique pattern of sanctions from the case of 
U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar is captured through a comprehensive analysis from different 
facets. As from the first attempt, it is found that the main hypothesis of U.S. sanctions being 
ineffective in impairing Myanmar’s export cannot be rejected due to significant results of 
increased export to non-US countries during the sanction period despite the zero export to the 
U.S. according to the gravity model analysis. However, the growth rate of Myanmar’s export 
can be concluded as a slower rate when it is compared with the neighboring countries 
especially when newly industrializing countries such as Thailand and Malaysia are included 
in the analysis. The second attempt of analysis on the export structure proved that Myanmar 
become more dependent on natural resource exports especially natural gas and gemstones 
mainly to Thailand and China. These two attempts, together, explain that the U.S. sanctions 
failed to impair Myanmar’s export in economic perspective due to the trade diversion to new 
major partners and diversification for new export drivers. 
The third attempt showed that the military regime’s response to the U.S. policy goals 
highly obvious politically despite the growth of export. The achievement of modest policy 
goals during the second episode of sanctions such as the release of Aung San Suu Kyi after 
the introductions without enactment of sanction laws as a warning showed the military 
regime’s interest to normalize the relation with Washington. The announcement and 
execution of the “roadmap to disciplined democracy” after the two sanction laws in the third 
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episode of sanctions proved that U.S. policy goals for regime change and democratization 
achieved successfully from the political perspective. This theory was further strengthened by 
reviewing and revising the political economy assessment, as a fourth attempt, through the 
analytical framework of Hufbauer et. al. 
This study addresses the impact of U.S. sanctions toward Myanmar as a 
comprehensive analysis from different perspectives. However, as no studies are free from 
limitations, there are several gaps of research still need to improve in further studies. The first 
issue is the explanation of the economic impact only through export pattern and structure. To
capture the more comprehensive picture of economic impact, further research should address 
the changes in other important economic indicators such as foreign direct investment and 
official development assistance. The second issue is the need for further inquiry on the 
interest of military regime behind the tendency to normalize the relation with Washington 
and the regime change itself which may lead to extensive research in the international 
relations perspective such as Beijing factor and other regional factors or interesting domestic 
political history analysis on the civil-military relations of Myanmar. 
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